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ABSTRACT 
With millions of Americans unable to cope with the rising costs 
of prescription drugs, and many even forced to go without health 
insurance, the mounting pressure on Congress to enact major 
healthcare reform culminated in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003. This iBrief examines 
this legislation, and concludes that it provides elusive benefits for 
seniors and merely creates a windfall for the pharmaceutical and 
insurance industries.   
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In 2002, aggregate health spending in the United States reached an 
astounding $1.6 trillion.2  As the second richest country in the world,3 it is 
even more staggering to find that healthcare spending increased by 9.3% 
while the gross domestic product increased by only 3.9%.4  Retail prescription 
drug sales, which reached an all-time high of $162.4 billion, accounted for the 
largest increase in healthcare spending.5  Moreover, when coupled with 
                                                     
1 Melissa Ganz is a third year student at Duke University Law School.  She 
graduated magna cum laude from the University of Pennsylvania with a B.A. in 
History and Sociology of Science with a concentration in Bioethics.  
2 Katherine Levit, et al., Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, 23 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 147, 147 (2004).  
3 GDP (PER CAPITA) (TOP 100 COUNTRIES), NATIONMASTER.COM (2003), at 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco_gdp_cap (citing figures from the 2002 
CIA World Factbook that indicate the United States’ per capita gross domestic 
product is the second highest in the world at $35, 991.96 per person) (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2004).  
4 Levit, supra note 2, at 147; see also Cynthia Smith, Retail Prescription Drug 
Spending in the National Health Accounts, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 160, 166 (2004) 
(“[T]he rate of [prescription drug] spending growth is expected to continue to 
outstrip gains in GDP.”).   
5 Levit, supra note 2, at 148, 154.  While aggregate growth in spending for 
prescription drugs has actually decreased slightly because of factors such as state 
use of preferred drug lists, fewer new drug entities entering the market place, and 
more generics in the marketplace, increased third party coverage has fueled 
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chronic care spending, long-term care now represents more than 75% of all 
healthcare expenditures.6  Economists predict this figure will only continue to 
escalate as the Baby Boomer generation ages.7   
¶2 While increased expenditures represent a stable economic status and 
evidence of our nation’s ability to pay for life-extending healthcare, it is 
undeniable that the current healthcare system is inefficient and unsustainable.8  
Given the high level of healthcare spending and the rising number of 
individuals who are unable to afford proper healthcare, the uneven and unjust 
nature of the American healthcare system is patently obvious.  More than 40 
million Americans are uninsured,9 and more elderly patients every year must 
chose between paying for prescription drugs and paying for rent.10   
¶3 In December 2003, President Bush signed into the law the most 
recent federal healthcare reform—the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).11  This iBrief looks at 
the various components of the MMA and addresses the major implications of 
this more than 700 page bill.  Part I examines the factors that led to healthcare 
and prescription drug coverage reform.  Next, Part II gives a general overview 
of the MMA.  Part III contextualizes these provisions and analyzes their 
impact on the American healthcare system.  Finally, this iBrief argues that 
while the MMA is well intentioned, it may actually exacerbate the underlying 
problems of the healthcare system and create a windfall for the 
pharmaceutical and insurance industries. 
I. THE BRAND NAME PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE STRUGGLE 
TO MAINTAIN POWER 
¶4 Brand name prescription retail sales are at an all-time high.  In 2002, 
the brand name pharmaceutical firm Pfizer recorded revenues totaling $32.4 
billion, including over $8 billion in retail sales of their cholesterol-reducing 
                                                                                                                       
continued growth in the demand for and the use of newer, more expensive drugs.  
Id. at 156-57; Smith, supra note 4, at 161-62. 
6 R. Sanders Williams, Address at the Duke Health Law Society Symposium, 
Science and Better Medicine: A Changing Perspective (Feb. 18, 2004) (power 
point presentation on file with author). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Robert Pear & Milt Freudenheim, Drug Discounts Beginning Tuesday, but Sign-
Ups Lag, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at A1. [hereinafter Sign-Ups Lag]. 
11 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified at 26 USCA §§ 139A, 
223, 4980G; 42 USCA §§ 299b-7, 1395b-8, 1395b-9, 1395w-3a, 1395w-3b, 
1395w-27a, 1395w-29, 1395w-101 to 1395w-104, 1395w-111 to 1395w-116, 
1395w-131 to 1395w-134, 1395w-141, 1395w- 151, 1395w-152, 1395cc-3, 
1395kk-1, 1395zz, 1395hhh, 1396u-5) [hereinafter MMA]. 
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drug Lipitor.12  In the same year, companies such as Merck and AstraZeneca 
grossed retail sales of over $5.6 billion and $4.6 billion for their high-demand 
drugs Zocor and Prilosec, respectively.13  For the fifth straight year, 
pharmaceutical firms ranked as the most profitable industry in the nation.14 
Pfizer led U.S. pharmaceutical companies with $7.8 billion in profits 
in 2001, which is more than the profits of all the Fortune 500 
companies in the homebuilding, apparel, railroad, and publishing 
industries combined.  Merck was the second most profitable 
pharmaceutical netting $7.3 billion, which is more than the profits of 
all the Fortune 500 companies in the semi-conductor, pipeline, food 
production, mining and crude oil production, and hotel, casino and 
resort industries combined.15 
¶5 With such an enormous financial interest in maintaining high 
prescription drug prices and market exclusivity, pharmaceutical companies 
have spent millions of dollars to extend patent protection and forestall 
government regulation of prescription drug prices.  From 1999 to 2003, the 
pharmaceutical industry made campaign contributions of more than $50 
million in an effort to keep drug prices unregulated16 and from 1996 to 2003 
spent $435 million to influence Congress via the efforts of more than 600 
lobbyists.17    
¶6 The increase in both health expenditures and pharmaceutical industry 
profits has not gone unnoticed.  Physicians, consumers, and state governments 
alike are buying drugs from Canada and Mexico, despite possible legal 
ramifications, because the difference in the cost of drugs in those countries is 
drastically lower than in the United States. 18  State and city governments in 
                                                     
12 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much for Drugs, TIME, 
Feb. 2, 2004, at 45, 47, 51. 
13 Id. 
14 Pharmaceutical Industry Ranks as Most Profitable Industry—Again, PUB. 
CITIZEN, Apr. 18, 2002 [hereinafter Pharma Most Profitable], available at 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1088.  Pfizer’s profits increased 
another $1.3 billion in 2002 to $9.1 billion.  Barlett, supra note 12, at 51. 
15 Pharma Most Profitable, supra note 14 (emphasis in original).  
16 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Gardiner Harris, Industry Fights to Put Imprint on Drug 
Bill, NY TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at A1. 
17 Barlett, supra note 12, at 52. 
18 See Julie Appleby, FDA threatens stores that sell Canadian drugs to U.S. 
residents, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/2003-04-08canadadrugs-
_x.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); Joel Baglole, Getting the Gray Out, Feb. 11, 
2003, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, at 
http://onlinewsj.com/artic./0,,SB1044557607157100653,00.html (last visited Mar. 
10, 2004); Tara Parker-Pope, The Ins and Outs of Buying Legal Drugs Across 
Borders, Oct. 22, 2002, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, at 
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Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, New York, and 
Massachusetts have all begun investigating or implementing programs to 
import cheaper prescription drugs from Canada.19    
¶7 As consumer pressure mounts and evidence suggests that the Food 
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) crack-down on the illegal importation of 
prescription drugs has little to do with actual safety concerns and more to do 
with the pharmaceutical industry’s vast political influence over the FDA,20 
various entities have filed lawsuits seeking the right to import prescription 
drugs.21    Most recently, Governor Jim Douglas announced that Vermont 
expects to be the first state to sue the FDA for their recent “unsubstantiated” 
denial of a pilot program aimed at lowering prescription drug expenditures for 
current and retired state employees by nearly $1 million via a state contract 
with a Canadian mail-order pharmaceutical company.22   
¶8 Such attempts to find less expensive means of obtaining prescription 
drugs are the offshoot of a recent shift in the consumer market toward 
generics.  Brand name pharmaceutical companies have been experiencing 
declining profits as people opt for generic bioequivalents of brand name 
prescription drugs that cost, on average, 30-60% less than their brand name 
counterparts.23  For example, since the expiration of Claritin’s patent 
protection in December 2002, Schering-Plough’s retail sales for the drug 
                                                                                                                       
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1035229711265527711.djm,00.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2004).   
19 See Julie Appleby, Boston, N.H. look to Canada for drugs, USA TODAY, Dec. 
10, 2003, at 1A; Monica Davey, Illinois Might Purchase Drugs From Canada, 
Saving Millions, 123 THE TECH 40, Sept. 16, 2003, at http://www-
tech.mit.edu/V123/N40/long2_drugs.40w.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004); 
Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers’ New Intensity in Defense of U.S. Borders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at C1 [hereinafter Defense of U.S. Borders]; Gardiner 
Harris, Cheap Drugs From Canada: Another Political Hot Potato, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2003, at C1; Gardiner Harris & Monica Davey, U.S. Steps Up Effort 
Against Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at C1; Illinois governor pushes 
for drug-buying program, CNN.COM, Dec. 22, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/12/22/prescription.drugs.ap/index.html.  
20 See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Vermont Will Sue U.S. for the Right to Import Drugs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A13. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Gail Russell Chaddock, Profits, Politics, and a Drug patent, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, July 19, 2000, available at  
http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/07/19/text/p1s2.html (last visited Mar. 
14, 2004). 
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declined more than $1.8 billion in the first half of 2003 and led to a staggering 
20% decline in Schering-Plough’s stock price.24 
¶9 In an attempt to maintain control over the American drug market, 
pharmaceutical companies have countered reimportation efforts by reducing 
their overall drug sales to Canadian retailers.25  Pointedly, Pfizer has ordered 
its Canadian wholesale distributors to provide lists of sales of its products to 
individual drugstores, warning that Pfizer will halt all drug supplies if drugs 
are being sold to American sources.26   
A. Congress’ Initial Attempt to Balance Power in the Industry 
¶10 Congress spent six years debating and amending a bill, referred to as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,27 aimed at balancing the interests of 
consumers in receiving safe and affordable medications with those of both the 
brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies in protecting patent rights 
and maintaining profitability.28  Specifically, the Act established three key 
measures: (1) patent term restoration for brand name patents,29 (2) the ability 
for generic firms to file an “abbreviated new drug application” (ANDA) for 
any new generic drug,30 and (3) a 180-day period of exclusivity for sales and 
                                                     
24 Amy Tsao, Schering-Plough: Drugmaker, Heal Thyself, BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE, June 11, 2003, at  
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2003/tc20030611_0956_tc0
55.htm  (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). 
25 Defense of U.S. Borders, supra note 19, at C1. 
26 Barlett, supra note 12, at 49. 
27 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 
301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 
(1994)).    
28 See H.R. Rep. 98-857(I), at ¶ 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647-48 (affirming that the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted “to make available 
more low cost generic drugs . . . [and] to create a new incentive for increased 
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are subject to 
pre-market approval”).   
29 To appease brand name firms, patent term extensions were made available for 
losses in patent terms cause by FDA regulatory delays, but only if drug firms 
employed due diligence in achieving any such patent term restoration.  35 U.S.C. § 
156 (2000).  Patent term restorations may be obtained that are equal to one-half of 
the time it takes to run human clinical trials on a new drug plus the period of FDA 
review.  However, the maximum extension is five years and the total length of 
exclusivity cannot exceed 14 years.  Id.  
30 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2000).  As an incentive to expedite the production and 
approval of generic drugs, the Act also permitted generic firms to submit an 
ANDA, whereby FDA safety and efficacy testing was no longer mandatory with a 
demonstration of bioequivalence to a brand name drug.  Id.  However, the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetics Act did require ANDA applicants to certify that the patent on 
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marketing given to the first generic firm to file an ANDA with the FDA.31  
Brand name pharmaceutical companies were also given an additional 
protection against potential abuses by generic firms.    Accordingly, an 
automatic 30 month stay on FDA approval of any generic ANDA was granted 
if a brand name firm initiated a legal challenge asserting patent 
infringement.32 
¶11 Despite the fact that these new provisions increased the availability 
and use of generic prescription drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act ultimately 
failed to achieve its goals or adequately address the problems that Congress 
originally sought to remedy.  In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Act exacerbated the 
power struggle between brand name pharmaceutical companies, generic firms, 
and the public.  The Act was susceptible to further monopolistic abuses such 
as antitrust violations, further delays in the release of generic drugs, and 
significant increases in prescription drug prices.33 A Federal Trade 
                                                                                                                       
the drug or method of use: (I) had not been filed in a previous patent application; 
(II) had expired; (III) would expire on a particular date; OR (IV) was 
invalid/would not be infringed by the drug for which the ANDA was being sought.  
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  In the case of a “paragraph IV certification,” the brand name 
drug company would be given notice, § 355(j)(2)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(6) 
(2003), and a 45-day period within which they could bring an action for patent 
infringement against the ANDA applicant.  § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).   Such an action 
automatically triggered a mandatory 30-month stay on the approval of the ANDA.  
Id. 
31 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2).  The Act also provided a financial incentive for generic 
drug companies to challenge allegedly invalid patents or market drugs that they 
believe do not infringe on current brand name patents.  The first generic firm to 
file an ANDA with the FDA would be granted a 180-day period of exclusivity 
during which no other generic manufacturer may obtain FDA approval or market 
its version of the drug.  § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).    
32 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
33See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of 
Patent Settlements Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
107th Cong. (2001) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission) 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm; see also NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL 
FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES IN 2001: ANOTHER YEAR OF 
ESCALATING COSTS (Mar. 29, 2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org; FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY (July 2002) [hereinafter FTC STUDY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last revised Sept. 10, 2002).  
After instituting several complaints against some of the leading brand name and 
generic pharmaceutical companies for alleged antitrust actions including, 
agreements made by drug companies to (1) intentionally delay generic drug 
competition in exchange for millions of dollars, (2) tie up key ingredients used in 
the making of prescription drugs so that demand was increased, and (3) impose 
unwarranted price increases, the FTC finally proposed an industry-wide study to 
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Commission (FTC) study conducted in 2002 demonstrated that generic drug 
entry into the marketplace has been delayed even further by cunning 
manipulations of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 34  For example, the 30-month stay 
provision, which was designed to protect brand name firms from the improper 
appropriation of patented drugs, has been abused in several instances to delay 
the entry of generic drugs into the marketplace for up to 12 years in some 
cases.35 
¶12 The same FTC study also found that the regulations governing the 
180-day period of exclusivity granted to generic firms for filing the first 
ANDA were problematic.36  Although the 180-day marketing exclusivity 
provision was intended to facilitate and encourage generic firms to bring their 
drugs to market sooner, it actually delayed the entry of such generics into the 
marketplace.37  The 180-day exclusivity period only begins to run from the 
first date of commercial marketing of the generic, or from the date of a court 
decision declaring the brand name patent invalid or not infringed. As such, the 
FTC study found multiple instances where generic firms suspended the start 
of the 180-day exclusivity period (1) as part of a settlement agreement in 
patent infringement suits brought by brand name firms, or (2) until a court 
decision had been rendered in their favor.38  Therefore, all generic competition 
in the marketplace is suspended indefinitely when the first firm to file an 
ANDA fails to trigger the start of their exclusive rights.39   
                                                                                                                       
examine the impediments to a more competitive and less costly drug market.  Id.; 
see also, Federal Trade Commission Decision and Order, In the Matter of Abbott 
Laboratories, (Mar. 16, 2000) (No. 981 0395) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03; Federal Trade Commission Administrative 
Complaint, In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P., 
and Andrx Corporation, (Mar. 16, 2000) (No. 9293), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03; Federal Trade Commission In the Matter of 
Schering-Plough Corporation, et al., (Mar. 30, 2001) (No. 9297).   
34FTC STUDY, supra note 33. 
35 Debra Z. Anderson, The Private Sector: Delaying Cheap Pills, POST-GAZETTE, 
July 19, 2003, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/03119/180170.stm.  
36 FTC STUDY, supra note 33. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. The FDA has recently enacted new regulations that attempt to address these 
concerns.  21 C.F.R. § 314, et. seq.  The new regulations which became 
enforceable on December 18, 2003, limit brand name firms to a single automatic 
30-month stay to resolve any allegations of false “paragraph IV certifications” and 
curtail the late filing of frivolous patents in an effort to delay generic drug entry 
into the marketplace. §§ 314.52, 314.95, 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).  Instead, the FDA 
will now require pharmaceutical firms to submit detailed patent information 
regarding the active ingredients, the drug composition, the approved uses of the 
drug, and a signed affidavit that certifies the validity of such information.  §§ 
314.94-.95, 314.101.  False submissions to the FDA will also result in strict 
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¶13 Due to the problems created by the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
continued negative press about the high costs of prescription drugs, the MMA 
was touted as problem-solving reform and was strong-armed into law.  Yet, 
even before the ink from Bush’s signature could dry, the bill was already 
being criticized for its elusive benefits.40   
II. CONGRESS’ SECOND ATTEMPT AT REFORM: THE MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT & MODERNIZATION                  
ACT OF 2003 
A. Provisions for Seniors 
¶14 The MMA has been touted as a solution for elderly people with low 
incomes and very high drug bills.  For the first time since the inception of the 
Medicare program in 1965, seniors will be given the opportunity to have 
prescription drug coverage under a new voluntary “Medicare Part D” benefit 
plan.  Coverage is scheduled to take effect in two stages.  Beginning in June 
2004, Medicare participants were able to buy discount drug cards for use at 
retail pharmacies.41  The second phase of the MMA, scheduled to begin in 
2006, will permit Medicare beneficiaries to sign up for a stand-alone drug 
plan or join a private health plan with drug coverage.42   
1. Discount Drug Cards—§ 101  
¶15 Under Title I, § 101 of the MMA, the Department of Health & 
Human Services must establish a temporary prescription drug discount plan.43  
Under the plan, Medicare participants who are not already given drug benefits 
under Medicaid are eligible to purchase discount drug cards for $30 a year.44  
In addition, the Act requires the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to ensure that each geographic area offers at least two alternative 
                                                                                                                       
criminal penalties. §§ 314.80, 314.81, 314.170, 314.630.    Although the new FDA 
regulations address two of the primary abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act, they 
ultimately fail to remedy the loopholes in the 180-day exclusivity period.    
40 See Robert Pear, Medicare Law’s Costs and Benefits Are Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Costs and Benefits Are Elusive]. 
41  Robert Pear, Coalition Promoting Drug Discount Cards, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2004, at Al. 
42 The Skinny On The Medicare Bill, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov. 25, 2003 [hereinafter 
The Skinny], at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/25/politics/main585469.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
43 MMA § 101 (1860D-31) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-141).  
44 Id.; ARENT FOX, HEALTHCARE ALERT: MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2003); Alan M. Schlein, 
Medicare Reform Bill—Loved, Hated, Hailed and Decried.  What’s in it for you?, 
FIFTY PLUS, Jan. 2004, at 6, 7. 
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choices and publicizes the coverage—i.e. prices, fees, & formularies—for 
these discount card programs.45   
Card sponsors also will have to (1) ensure acceptance of their cards at 
a sufficiently large network of retail pharmacies located throughout 
their service area (i.e., access may not be provided solely through 
mail-order pharmacies); (2) require that pharmacists at participating 
outlets routinely explain price differences between brand and generic 
products; and (3) disclose to CMS “the extent to which negotiated 
price concessions... by a manufacturer are passed through to enrollees 
through pharmacies or otherwise.”46 
Discount cards entitle holders to privately negotiated discounts ranging from 
10-25% on those prescription drugs listed under the chosen card plan.47   
2. New Drug Benefit—§ 101   
¶16 In January 2006, discount drug cards will give way to the second 
phase of the MMA, which aims to provide two more comprehensive options 
to reduce the cost of prescription drugs for seniors.48  Eligible seniors can 
enroll in either a “qualified” Prescription Drug Plan or a Medicare Advantage 
plan.49   
¶17 Under these qualified plans, beneficiaries will pay a $35 per month 
premium in exchange for either “standard prescription drug coverage” or an 
out-of-pocket plan with deductibles, both of which are equivalent in 
coverage.50  Standard prescription drug coverage has a $250 annual deductible 
and covers 75% of all costs associated with those drugs listed under the plan 
up to $2,250 (or a total annual benefit of $1,500).51  However, where drug 
costs exceed $2,250, there is no additional benefit until out-of-pocket 
expenses reach $3,600.52  If prescription drug costs reach $5,100, said plans 
                                                     
45 MMA § 101 (1860D-3(a)(1)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
103(a)(1)).  
46 ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 2. 
47 Barlett, supra note 12, at 46; ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 2 (“To facilitate 
discounting, the legislation expressly exempts price concessions that 
manufacturers extend to Medicare-endorsed card sponsors from Best Price 
determinations under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute.”). 
48 MMA §§ 101 (1860D-1—4) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-
101—4).   
49 Id. at § 101 (1860D-1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101). 
50 The Skinny, supra note 42. 
51 Id. at §§ 101 (1860D-2(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395w-102(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A)). 
52 Id. at § 101 (1860D-2(b)(4)(B)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-
102(b)(4)(B)). 
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will cover 95% of any additional costs.53  Supplementary aid is also available 
for catastrophic expenses or when participants’ yearly income and assets fall 
below a certain level.54 
B. Provisions that Benefit all Americans 
1. Individual importation of drugs from Canada—§ 1121 
¶18 While the MMA does not permit the importation of prescription 
drugs from Canada by pharmacies and wholesalers, it does provide for the 
development of regulations that would allow for such importation on a limited 
basis by individuals.55  Those with a valid prescription would be entitled to a 
90-day supply of a pre-approved drug, in proper dosage form, from a 
registered Canadian seller.56  Moreover, the Secretary of DHHS would be 
permitted to enact any other restrictions on drug importation that he or she 
deemed “necessary to ensure public safety.”57  
2. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)—§ 1201 
¶19 Title XII of the MMA provides for the establishment of Health 
Savings Accounts (HSA) for those individuals who have high deductible 
insurance plans.58  HSAs differ from the pre-existing Archer Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs) provided for in 26 U.S.C. § 220 in that they are not limited 
to individuals who are self-employed or work for a small employer.59  In 
addition, HSAs permit individuals or families to establish a tax free fund for 
the entire amount of their health insurance deductible over $1,000 (or $2,000 
for families) and up to $2,250 (or $4,500 for families), unlike MSAs which 
                                                     
53 The Skinny, supra note 42. 
54 The Skinny, supra note 42. 
55 Id. at § 1121(j)(2) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(2)).  Despite the 
fact that § 1121(b) appears to usher in the importation of drugs from Canada by 
retailers and wholesaler, such a program is not likely because of the language of 
the MMA.  MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, HEALTH LAW UPDATE: CONGRESS 
APPROVES MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, 34 
(2003) (“Prior similar authority granted to the secretary was never effectuated 
because neither the former secretary, nor the current one would conclude that 
importation posed ‘no additional risk to the public’s health and safety’ and/or that 
it would ‘result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the 
American consumer.’  The [MMA] contains a nearly identical certification 
requirement, therefore making it unlikely that it will be lawful to import drugs 
from Canada any time soon.”) 
56 Id. at § 1121(j)(3) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(3)). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. § 1201 (223-24) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 223-24). 
59 See 26 U.S.C. § 220(c)(1)(A) (2000). 
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only permit a tax deduction of 75%.60  Individuals 55 years or older are also 
permitted to increase their tax deductible contribution to HSAs by $500 in 
2004, $600 in 2005, and by annual $100 increases not exceeding $1,000 by 
2009.61   
¶20 Additionally, Congress has ensured that eligible individuals will not 
be able to double-count such health-related tax deductions by coordinating 
benefits of HSAs with those from previously existing MSAs; individuals  who 
make contributions to HSAs must annually deduct the aggregate amount paid 
to MSAs for the same taxable year.62 
C. Provisions for The Insurance Industry: The Move Toward Private 
Plan Coverage 
¶21 Prior to the MMA, Medicare beneficiaries were permitted to enroll 
in a managed care plan under Part C, or “Medicare + Choice plans,” and 
receive the benefits of both Part A and Part B services.63  While Medicare + 
Choice plans are already provided by private insurance companies under 
government contract, the MMA increases the role of private insurance by 
attracting more private companies via the creation of a more competitive fee 
structure for reimbursement under Medicare Advantage plans (MA).64  In 
addition, the MMA permits the establishment of regional plans that will 
permit smaller insurance companies to provide MA coverage and will likely 
encourage better discounts for plan participants via increased competition.65   
D. Provisions that Benefit the Drug Industry 
1. Brand Name Drug Companies—§§ 101, 1102, 1121 
¶22 Brand name prescription drug companies will receive several 
benefits under the MMA.  First, all of the prescription discounts that the 
                                                     
60 MMA §§ 1201 (223(b)(2)(A)-(B)) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 
223(b)(2)(A)-(B)) (eligible individuals or families may only deduct the lesser of 
their annual health insurance deductible or  $2,250 or $4,500, respectively).  
61 Id. at §1201 (223(b)(3)(B)) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.                         § 
223(b)(3)(B)). 
62 Id. at § 1201 (223(b)(4)(A) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.                         § 
223(b)(4)(A)). 
63 See MEDICARE, MEDICARE PLAN CHOICES OVERVIEW, at 
http://www.medicare.gov/Choices/Overview.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2004). 
64 ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 8.  The fee structure created by the MMA will 
initially compensate participating private insurance companies by the same amount 
currently awarded under Medicare’s fee-for-service plans, but will incrementally 
increase by either 2% annually or by the additional per capita growth of the new 
plan.  Id. 
65 Id. 
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elderly will receive under the bill will remain privately regulated.66  Second, 
in an effort to forestall abuses of patent monopolies by generic companies, the 
bill eliminates the 180-day exclusivity period that competing bioequivalent 
generic drugs were awarded under the Hatch-Waxman Act.67 Third, the MMA 
provides for a study on the safety and cost-effectiveness of importing drugs 
from Canada, including a provision that might enable the enactment of such 
regulations—it does not, however, make such importation legal for 
pharmacists or wholesalers.68  As such, brand name drug companies still 
remain largely in control of prescription drug prices for American consumers. 
2. Generic Drug Companies—§§ 1101, 1103  
¶23 Last year the FDA enacted new regulations that addressed abuses to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 69  The new regulations, which went into effect on 
December 18, 2003, limit brand name firms who challenge abbreviated new 
drug applications (ANDAs) for patenting generic drugs to a single, automatic 
30-month stay to resolve any allegations of false “paragraph IV 
certifications.”70  The new regulations also curtail the late filing of frivolous 
                                                     
66 The Skinny, supra note 42. 
67 MMA § 1102(a)(2)(D) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)).  Although the 
forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity provision does not appear to benefit brand 
name prescription drug companies on its face, it has the effect of permitting them 
to keep their monopoly on the market for a longer period of time.  In addition, 
forfeiture of the exclusivity period may even be provoked by brand name 
companies who cause generic companies to violate these provisions.  For example, 
the exclusivity period may be forfeited by generic companies for a failure to 
market or entering into an agreement with another applicant/patent owner to 
forestall bringing their drug to market.  Id.  Yet, the penalty specified for brand 
name drug companies who induce generic companies to act in such a manner may 
not be much more than a drop in the bucket compared to continued monopolies on 
sales of blockbuster drugs.  See  MMA § 1115 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note) 
(citing civil penalties of not more than $11,000 each day that a brand name drug 
company fails to file any such agreements with the FTC. Thus, a brand name drug 
company such as Pfizer could potentially induce a generic firm to contract with 
them to delay the release of a bioequivalent drug to Lipitor for an entire year and 
later only be fined a mere $4,015,000 ($11,000 x 365 days) as compared to the 
additional retail sales of over $8 billion; making their net profit worth such 
infringements.). 
68 MMA § 1121 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 note, 381 note, 384 
note, 535); The Skinny, supra note 42.  There is also criticism of the provision of 
the MMA that allows for a study on the effects of importing drugs on a larger scale 
from Canada because of the manner in which such studies will be carried out. See 
Robert Pear, U.S. to Study Importing Canada Drugs but Choice of Leader Prompts 
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at A16.  However, this section did make it 
legal for individuals to import prescription drugs on a limited basis.  Id.   
69 21 C.F.R. § 314; See supra text accompanying note 39. 
70 §§ 314.52, 314.95, 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).   
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patents by brand name drug companies trying to delay generic drug entry into 
the marketplace.71   
¶24 Although the new FDA regulations addressed two of the main 
problems that generic drug companies experienced under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, Title XI of the MMA (“Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals”) 
expressly amends the 1984 provisions in a similar fashion.72  Moreover, the 
bill adds a new provision that makes bioequivalence of generic drugs easier to 
prove.73 
III. ANALYSIS OF MMA: BIG BENEFITS FOR BIG PHARMA & THE 
PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AT THE EXPENSE OF REAL BENEFITS 
FOR SENIORS 
¶25 With so many provisions in the MMA, it would seem that there is 
something for everyone.  However, the bill is receiving much more criticism 
than praise, especially from those who initially spearheaded the efforts to 
reform Medicare. Many Congressional representatives who strongly favored a 
Medicare reform bill voted against the MMA, arguing that it was a false 
reform designed to make Republicans look good.74  
A. The MMA: A Product of Bad Law-Making?  
¶26 Signs of what may be termed “irresponsible politics” abound in the 
passage of the MMA.  As late as November 18, 2003, less than a month 
before President Bush signed the bill into law, much of the text of the MMA 
was still unavailable to most legislators.75  For such a complicated and lengthy 
bill with far reaching implications, it is highly problematic that legislators 
may have been signing off on many provisions that they either did not know 
were included or whose potential effects they did not have the opportunity to 
understand.  
¶27  Many of the bill’s supporters openly acknowledged its many 
imperfections prior to approval but failed to push for changes, either because 
                                                     
71 §§ 314.80, 314.81, 314.94-.95, 314.101, 314.170, 314.630.     
72 MMA § 1102 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).  
73 MMA § 1103 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)). 
74 See Schlein, supra note 44, at 6 (“‘Who do you trust,’ [Senator Edward] 
Kennedy argued.  ‘The HMO—coddling, drug-company-loving, Medicare-
destroying, Social Security-hating Bush administration?  Or do you trust 
Democrats, who created Medicare and will fight with you to defend it every day of 
every week of every year?’”). 
75 Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Medicare Plan Covering Drugs Backed by AARP, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A1.  
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they wanted to be able to say that they had passed a discount drug bill or out 
of fear of defying those who had contributed millions to their campaigns.76  
¶28 In addition, accusations exist that the Bush administration concealed 
the actual costs of the bill—between $500 and $600 billion—prior to 
Congress’ vote on the matter.77  Some representatives have claimed that cost 
estimates of the MMA were repeatedly and expressly withheld by the Bush 
administration.78  These claims were recently confirmed by the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) internal investigation.79  The report on 
the investigation, issued July 6, 2004, found that the top Medicare 
administrator, Thomas A. Scully, threatened to fire the program’s chief 
actuary, Richard S. Foster, if he were to tell Congress that the drug benefits in 
the MMA would likely cost much more than the White House had originally 
estimated.80   
¶29 Amplifying the feeling that political wrangling will leave Americans 
to pay the high costs of the MMA is the fact that the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) has been able to create a similar prescription drug discount plan 
on a large scale that, according to a National Academy of Sciences study, has 
“meaningfully reduced drug expenditures without a demonstrable adverse 
[effect] on quality” and without a large effect on the federal budget.81  Not 
only was the VA plan ignored as a model for the new Medicare benefit plan, 
but other plausible money saving alternatives were also ignored, including 
vouchers for the purchase of health insurance and proposals to only aid low 
income individuals.82   
                                                     
76 Id.  (Consider the following comments: “This is not a perfect bill, but America 
cannot wait for perfect”; “‘Getting a large benefit for lots of people that didn’t 
exist before is very alluring,’ said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New 
York.  Yet Mr. Schumer said he had grave concerns about other parts of the bill 
that he called ‘a total sellout to the pharmaceutical industry.’”). 
77 Robert Pear & Edmund L. Andrews, White House Says Congressional Estimate 
of New Medicare Costs Was Too Low, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A14 
[hereinafter Congressional Estimate Too Low]; Robert Pear, Inquiry Confirms Top 
Medicare Official Threatened Actuary Over Cost of Drug Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 7, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Official Threatened Actuary]. 
78 Congressional Estimate Too Low, supra note 77, at A14; Official Threatened 
Actuary, supra note 77, at A1. 
79 Official Threatened Actuary, supra note 77, at A1. 
80 Id.  In February 2004, Representative Nick Smith of Michigan was accused of 
voting for the MMA in exchange for support for his son’s congressional campaign.  
Carl Hulse, Inquiry Sought in House Vote on Drug Plan for Medicare, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A13.     
81 Robert Pear & Walt Bogdanich, Some Successful Models Ignored as Congress 
Works on Drug Bill, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A1.  
82 Id. 
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B. The MMA Provides Elusive Benefits for Seniors 
¶30 The provisions aimed at lowering prescription drug costs for seniors 
are inherently uncertain.  Although President Bush has promised discounts of 
up to 25%,83 the text of the MMA makes such discounts anything but certain.  
For example, the Act expressly prohibits government “interference” in the 
negotiations of such discounts.84 Although the rationale expressly stated in 
this provision, “to promote competition,” seems logical, it effectuates a 
privately controlled and unallied system.  Medicare is left without any 
leverage as a government entity because private entities are able to negotiate 
discounts and establish drug formularies based solely on what the drug 
companies deem proper.  Moreover, there are no standards for determining 
either the actual discounts or the lists of drugs that will be covered by the 
discount plans.  
¶31 In addition, MMA provisions that appear to create basic rules 
regarding the structure of discount drug plans may backfire and make 
discounts even more elusive and more difficult for providers to attain.  For 
example, plan providers are required to make at least two comparable drugs 
for every treatment category available to beneficiaries.85  However, this may 
not have the effect of creating options for plan users because plan providers 
will likely be forced to create set formularies to ensure compliance with this 
provision and to be able to negotiate any substantial discounts.  Discounts 
may be decreased even further because some smaller insurance companies—
such as those who agree to participate as regional providers—may be forced 
into a position marked by a lack in bargaining power.  Pointedly, drug 
companies will be able to gain a higher price for those drugs they know are 
required for plans to comply with MMA provisions.   
¶32 An inability to bargain for significant drug discounts could also lead 
to an increase in the $35 per month premium for plan participants and 
ultimately to participant drop out.  The ripple effect extends even farther when 
one notes that the discount drug plans provided for in the MMA are exactly 
what they are called—voluntary—86 and only a very small fraction of all 
seniors have chosen to enroll.87  The voluntary nature of these plans makes 
enrollment and the promise of negotiated discounts even more elusive when 
one recognizes that not only is there a great deal of confusion surrounding the 
                                                     
83 Schlein, supra note 44, at 6. 
84 MMA § 101 (1860D-11(i)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(j)).  
85 MMA § 101 (1860D-4) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
104(b)(3)(C)(i)). 
86 Id. § 101 (1860D-1) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101).  
87 Sign-Ups Lag, supra note 10, at A1 (“[I]t appears that fewer than one million 
people in the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program have signed up for 
cards.”). 
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MMA and what senior’s choices actually are,88 but a large number of 
Medicare beneficiaries may be unable to make informed healthcare choices 
due to Alzheimer’s disease and other incapacitating ailments.89  Adding to the 
current healthcare coverage crisis, the MMA is predicted to lead employers to 
reduce or eliminate their employer-sponsored prescription drug coverage for 
an estimated 1/3 of all retirees as soon as Medicare begins to offer coverage in 
2006.90 
¶33 Another concrete example of the deceptive nature of drug discount 
benefits stems from the very real, very large gaps in coverage.  As discussed 
supra, drug costs that exceed $2,250 are shifted to participants as out-of-
pocket expenses until they reach the catastrophic level and such individuals 
have paid over $3,600.91  However, these discount drug plans do not provide 
coverage for any drugs excluded from their plans (i.e. those that they are not 
able to negotiate discounts for) and out-of-pocket expenses paid to obtain 
such drugs are also not applied to the $3,600 limit required for additional 
coverage.92   
¶34 Furthermore, as per capita drug expenditures under Medicare 
increase over time, the costs associated with plan premiums, deductibles, as 
well as out-of-pocket expenses will also increase.93  “By 2013, for example, 
the out-of-pocket spending required before a person qualifies for catastrophic 
coverage will probably be $6,400, well above the $3,600 required in the first 
year.”94 
                                                     
88 See Older patients unaware of new Medicare law, CNN.COM, Feb. 26, 2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/02/26/medicare.survey.ap/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2004); Confusion surrounds new Medicare law, CNN.COM, Dec. 
22, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/12/22/medicare.confusion.ap/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2004). 
89 Costs and Benefits Are Elusive, supra note 40, at A1; Schlein, supra note 44, at 
6.  Others cite a lack of Internet access as another reason why it may be difficult 
for the elderly to choose the appropriate drug card program.  Sign-Ups Lag, supra 
note 10, at A1 (“Lucy E. Utt, director of the health insurance assistance program at 
the Tennessee Commission on Aging and Disability, said it was ‘almost 
impossible to make a card selection,’ without access to the Internet, either directly 
or through a friend, a relative or counselor.”). 
90 Robert Pear, Drug Law is Seen Leading to Cuts in Retiree Plans, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Cuts in Retiree Plans]. 
91 MMA § 101 (1860D-2(b)(1)), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
102(b)(1)). 
92 See Robert Pear, New Medicare Plan for Drug Benefits Prohibits Insurance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 1. 
93 Patches for the Drug Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 14 
[hereinafter Patches for the Drug Program.]. 
94 Id.  
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¶35 These large gaps in coverage might not place as large of a financial 
burden on participants if the MMA did not have an additional restriction on 
supplemental insurance coverage.95  Under the bill, plan participants will not 
be permitted to extend or purchase new Medigap (or similar private 
supplemental) insurance, count payments by former employment health plans 
toward the $3,600 limit on out-of-pocket expenses, or supplement any drug 
coverage from these Medicare plans with Medicaid drug coverage.96 
C.  The MMA Provides Big Benefits to the Pharmaceutical and 
Insurance Industries 
¶36 The most criticized aspect of the MMA is that it provides the greatest 
benefits to two already thriving industries: the drug and insurance industries.   
The unparalleled financial focus that the drug industry has placed on political 
lobbying, supra, has led to essentially “tailor-made” provisions that may be 
worth the huge sums paid.97  
¶37 Three provisions of the MMA exclusively benefit the drug and 
insurance industries: (1) privately administered benefit plans, (2) express 
prohibition of government participation in the negotiation of discounts, and 
(3) an increase in HMO reimbursements.  Because the MMA’s new discount 
drug plan will be privately administered, the insurance industry will benefit 
directly from an estimated $46 billion that will be “pumped” into managed 
care by the government over the next ten years.98  Moreover, greater 
government reimbursement—upwards of 25%—and increases in the number 
of enrollees in participating insurance plans will lead to greater overall 
revenues.99  In fact, investors seem to already be placing their bets that HMOs 
will experience a 2-5% increase in after-tax profits: shares of Humana have 
jumped from $8.81 to $21.53 in just 2 years—an increase of nearly 41%.100  
What is more troubling is that as buying power and profits increase, so too 
will the insurance industry’s political bargaining power with the government, 
making future cut backs or changes to the law difficult and unlikely.   
                                                     
95 Id.   
96 Id.   
97 Stolberg & Harris, supra note 16, at A1. 
98 See Milt Freudenheim, Using Medicare Billions, H.M.O’s Again Court Elderly, 
N.Y. TIMES.COM, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/business/09CARE.html?ex=1079873862&ei
=1&en=f7fcbb44df723040 (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).  
99 Id.; Schlein, supra note 44, at 6 (“Fewer than five million of the 40 million 
Medicare beneficiaries, about 12 percent, are in private plans.  The administration 
predicts that the proportion will grow to 35 by 2007, as beneficiaries enroll in 
HMOs and PPOs.”). 
100 Freudenheim, supra note 98, at A1. 
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¶38 As discussed supra, barring the government, and more specifically 
Medicare, from using its power to leverage lower discount prices against the 
drug industry will effectively keep prices higher and may make discounts 
much lower than anticipated.101  The precise monetary benefit to the drug 
industries, while unknown, is troubling in light of the extremely high price tag 
already placed on the MMA and has caused many to wonder if we aren’t 
paying twice for this bill—once as taxpayers and then again as consumers. 
D. The MMA May Be Fiscally Imprudent 
¶39 In addition to providing elusive benefits to seniors and helping to 
keep big industry profits high, the MMA has been described as a “fiscal train 
wreck.”102  Initially, financial estimates for the bill topped $395 billion over 
the next ten years.103  However, less than a month after President Bush signed 
the MMA into law, estimates suddenly rose to $540 billion.104  Moreover, this 
high estimate may escalate further if the level of drug discounts attained is 
lower than predicted.  With the federal deficit increasing to over $520 billion, 
its highest dollar level ever, tacking on at least another $145 billion to the 
price tag of this legislation105 has some legislators outraged and many 
Americans worried.  
¶40 Despite the fact that President Bush has promised to cut the federal 
deficit to $365 billion over the next five years, these estimates do not include 
the costs of the war in Iraq—more than $87 billion thus far—or the $162 
billion that it will cost to restructure the alternative minimum tax.106  
Moreover, it seems a bit underhanded that amidst all of his proclaimed efforts 
to provided affordable healthcare to those who need it, President Bush is 
planning on cutting back on federal Medicaid funding.  Vowing to restore the 
“fiscal integrity” to Medicaid, President Bush says that he will save 
Americans over $1.5 billion next year and $23.6 billion over the next ten by 
                                                     
101 See section II, A supra. 
102 The Medicare Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at A1. 
103 White House raising estimated cost of Medicare overhaul, CNN.COM, Jan. 29, 
2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.budget.ap/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter White House raising estimated cost of Medicare 
overhaul]. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Congressional Estimate Too Low, supra note 77, at A14; White House raising 
estimated cost of Medicare overhaul, supra note 103 (“Major priorities Bush 
proposed last year included: . . . $87 billion this year for wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, $500 million less than he got.”).  For more information on what the 
Alternative Minimum Tax is see Kaye A. Thomas, Alternative Minimum Tax 101, 
FAIRMARK PRESS, INC. (2004), at http://www.fairmark.com/amt/amt101.htm (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2004). 
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requiring stricter recording of state spending.107  It seems that this is a zero 
sum game—spending billions on Medicare just to cut back on Medicaid is 
like starving one hand to feed the other. 
CONCLUSION 
¶41 The costs of the MMA will likely far outweigh its advantages.  The 
majority of the MMA funds will be spent on satiating the drug industry’s 
desire to keep costs privately regulated and fattening the insurance industry’s 
bankroll by further privatizing Medicare—both at a higher cost to taxpayers 
and to the detriment of the average American, who will see only modest 
benefits in the form of larger tax breaks from HSAs and the possibility of 
being able to import drugs from Canada.108  Moreover, the estimated $540 
billion price tag on the MMA will have far-reaching economic effects that 
will likely force legislators to make fundamental changes to the tax system in 
the future and may ultimately cause the healthcare system in the United States 
to falter.109   
 
107 Robert Pear, U.S. Nears Clash With Governors on Medicaid Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2004, at A1.  While it may be true that states have begun to 
disproportionately utilize federal funds for their Medicaid programs, stricter 
policies that threaten to disturb the very existence of Medicaid may create an even 
more detrimental effect on the federal budget—requiring a larger federal remedy 
farther down the road.  Id. 
108 See, Elizabeth Becker & Robert Pear, Trade Pact May Undercut Inexpensive 
Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004 (discussing an international trade 
agreement set to be approved by Congress which would narrow the MMA’s 
provisions for the importation of drugs by allowing “pharmaceutical companies to 
prevent imports of drugs to the United States and also to challenge decisions by 
Australia about what drugs should be covered by the country’s health plan, the 
prices paid for them and how they can be used”). 
109 See, e.g., Patches for the Drug Program, supra note 93, § 4, at 14. 
